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Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules--
and the Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.*
Introduction
A quarter century ago, a junior Professor Judith Resnik helped alert us to the development
of “managerial judging” and the many issues it posed.1  Showing unease with trends that others had
presented as warranted responses to changing adjudicatory needs,2 she described many changes
from a relatively passive judicial role in pretrial case development and raised several concerns:
In the rush to conquer the mountain of work, no one--neither judges, court
administrators, nor legal commentators--has assessed whether relying on trial judges
for informal dispute resolution and for case management, either before or after trial,
is good, bad, or neutral.  Little empirical evidence supports the claim that judicial
management “works” either to settle cases or to provide cheaper, quicker, or fairer
dispositions.  Proponents of judicial management have also failed to consider the
systemic effects of the shift in judicial role.  Management is a new form of “judicial
activism,” a behavior that usually attracts substantial criticism.  Moreover, judicial
management may be teaching judges to value their statistics, such as the number of
case dispositions, more than they value the quality of their dispositions.  Finally,
because managerial judging is less visible and usually unreviewable, it gives trial
courts more authority and at the same time provides litigants with fewer procedural
safeguards to protect them from abuse of that authority. In short, managerial judging
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3Resnik, supra note 1, at 380 (footnotes omitted).
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5Resnik, supra note 1, at 379 (footnote omitted).
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may be redefining sub silentio our standards of what constitutes rational, fair, and
impartial adjudication.3
Professor Resnik concluded with a call not to risk judicial impartiality in the interest of case
disposition:
I want to take away trial judges’ roving commission and to bring back the
blindfold.  I want judges to balance the scales, not abandon them altogether in the
press to dispose of cases quickly.  No one has convincingly discredited the virtues
of disinterest and disengagement, virtues that form the bases of the judiciary’s au-
thority.  Our society has not yet openly and deliberately decided to discard the tradi-
tional adversarial model in favor of some version of the continental or inquisitorial
model.  Until we do so, federal judges should remain true to their ancestry and emu-
late the goddess Justicia.4
She recognized, though, that developments were likely to entrench judicial managerialism:  “Unless
the Supreme Court and Congress reject proposed amendments to the Federal Rules, pretrial judicial
management will be required in virtually all cases.”5
The then-pending amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did take effect in
1983, and rounds of amendments since have reinforced federal district judges’ managerial authority
in several areas of pretrial procedure.  From the relatively informal techniques of pioneers like
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Judges Peckham and Schwarzer,6 we have moved for better or worse into an era of “authorized
managerialism.”  It is not my purpose to evaluate this development; the limited empirical evidence
on managerial judging’s effectiveness in reducing delay and cost, to which Professor Resnik re-
ferred, remains--despite major later efforts--fairly inconclusive.7  Instead, in this essay I will first
briefly call attention to the specific ways in which federal judges’ managerial powers have been
written into the civil rules.  Then I will turn to a question to which Professor Resnik alluded--the
degree to which pretrial managerial judging, as we have it in American federal courts, entails
movement away from traditional American adversarialism and toward convergence with practices
in civil-law systems, which are often referred to as inquisitorial.  The answer appears to be some-
what, but less so than may have been assumed by some, and with more variation among civil-law
systems themselves than is sometimes recognized on this side of the Atlantic.
I.  Authorized Pretrial Managerialism in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
If one theme can fairly be said to dominate in the rounds of Civil Rule amendments that
have been adopted since Professor Resnik’s article, it is the authorization of both specific measures
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that trial courts can use and the wide discretion they have in pretrial litigation management.  A
survey of how several key rules have changed over the last quarter century can illustrate the extent
of the changes, which may come as something of a surprise to those who have not taken a look back
at where we stood around 1980.
A.  Sanctions Under Rule 11
Until 1983 Rule 11 was a sleepy little eight-sentence rule, which rather toothlessly stated
that an attorney’s signature on a pleading certified “that he has read the pleading; that to the best of
his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not inter-
posed for delay.”  Sanctions were limited to striking an offending pleading as “sham and false” and
to “appropriate disciplinary action”--but only for “a wilful violation.”  The original Rule 11 had
“not been effective in deterring abuses.”8  The 1983 amendments added not a great many words but
imposed an obligation of “reasonable inquiry” while sharpening standards as to both factual allega-
tions and legal bases and discarding wilfulness as a prerequisite for sanctions.  They authorized,
using apparently mandatory “shall” language, imposition of sanctions either upon motion or on the
court’s initiative, with discretion about the nature of sanctions but authorization for the award of
expenses including attorney fees.
After the explosion of satellite litigation under the 1983 version of Rule 11, the 1993 amend-
ments gave us the rule in its present form.  These amendments largely retained the 1983 standards
while revising key aspects of the process and sanctions, particularly by introducing the 21-day “safe
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10See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) (sanction imposed for Rule 11 violation “shall be limited to what is sufficient
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case management has been at least partly mandatory in cases not exempted by local rule under Rule 16(b)’s
requirement, see infra text accompanying note 22, of a scheduling order.
14FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 308 U.S. 645, 684 (1938) (amended 1983).
15FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
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harbor” for party-initiated sanction motions9 and limiting sanctions to what suffices for deterrence.10
Sanctions can still be imposed by judicial initiative, after notice and opportunity to show cause why
specific conduct did not violate the rule;11 and changing from “shall” to “may”12 made it explicit
that judges have discretion whether to impose sanctions at all as well as in deciding on what they
should be.  While Rule 11 is far from the leading authority for judicial case management--in partic-
ular, it is not a proactive tool and comes into play only after allegedly offending litigant action--it
does provide considerable scope for judicial initiative and discretion in dealing with and, we can at
least hope, deterring misconduct.
B.  Pretrial Conferences, Management, and Scheduling Under Rule 16
If any rule most strongly illustrates the authorization of pretrial managerialism, it is Rule
16.13  The change in the title of the rule itself, from “Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating Issues”14 at
the original framing to the present “Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management”15 in 1983
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reflects how the rulemakers largely took over a rule number to set up a detailed set of pretrial
management and scheduling objectives, procedures, and possible measures.  What we had from
1938 to 1983 was a rule that permitted the court to summon attorneys to a conference to consider
such matters as simplification of issues, pleading amendments, admissions, limiting the number of
expert witnesses, and reference of issues to a master.16  It did allow entry of pretrial orders to con-
trol the later course of the action,17 and considerable pretrial-management practice developed under
the rule as it stood18 as well as less formally.
Several of the specific points in original Rule 16 still appear in today’s version, but its
length and scope are far greater as a result of the 1983 and 1993 amendments.  Amendments that
took effect December 1, 2006 added, as part of a package of amendments dealing with discovery of
electronically stored information, authority to include in the Rule 16(b) scheduling order provisions
for e-discovery and party agreements on asserting claims of privilege or trial-preparation protection
after production.19  As Moore’s Federal Practice now puts it,
Rule 16 is explicitly intended to encourage the active judicial management of the
case development process and of trial in most civil actions.  Rule 16 calls on judges
to fix deadlines for completing the major pretrial tasks and encourages judges to
actively participate in designing case-specific plans for positioning litigation as
efficiently as possible for disposition by settlement, motion, or trial.  Rule 16 author-
izes and regulates use of a wide range of case management tools and powers--princi-
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pally through pretrial conferences.  It also authorizes a wide range of sanctions for
violations of pretrial orders.20
The rule, originally half a page and now about three pages, in its six subdivisions starts with
authorization for pretrial conferences and lists their objectives.21  Its two main subdivisions, (b) and
(c), dovetail with the parties’ required early Rule 26(f) conference by requiring an early scheduling
order with mandatory and discretionary scheduling items22 and provide a sixteen-item, open-ended
list of subjects that can be considered, and appropriate action taken upon, at any pretrial confer-
ence.23  These include, as augmented by the 1993 amendments to Rule 16(c), issue-narrowing,
discovery scheduling, summary adjudication, settlement and ADR, severance and trial bifurcation,
and trial-time limits.  The briefer three final subdivisions authorize a final pretrial conference, deal
with pretrial orders, and authorize sanctions for failure to obey scheduling orders plus failures to
appear at, be prepared for, or participate in good faith in a scheduling or pretrial conference.  By
any measure, Rule 16 gives judges more managerial arrows than can fit in an ordinary quiver.
C.  Managing Class Actions Under Rule 23
Authorized managerialism under Rule 23 has a somewhat longer pedigree than under most
other rules, with Rule 23(d) on orders in the conduct of class actions going back to the major 1966
amendments that created the present prerequisites and categories.  Rule 23(d)’s five-point list
begins with broad authority to “make appropriate orders:  (1) determining the course of the proceed-
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ings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of
evidence or argument” and ends with the catchall “(5) dealing with similar procedural matters.”  In
between are discretionary authority to require notice to class members beyond that required for
(b)(3) common-question actions under Rule 23(c)(2), to impose conditions on class representatives
and intervenors, and to require that pleadings be amended appropriately when an action with class
allegations will proceed on a non-class basis.  Rule 23(d) ends with authority to combine 23(d)
orders with orders under Rule 16, which as we have seen has been greatly expanded since Rule
23(d)’s adoption in 1966.
After efforts in the 1990s to amend standards for certifying class actions were abandoned,
and interlocutory appeal from class-certification grants and denials authorized,24 the Advisory
Committee turned to amendments governing the appointment of class counsel, settlement, and
attorney-fee awards.  These took effect December 1, 2003.  The counsel-appointment provisions of
new Rule 23(g) are largely guidelines for judicial selection of class counsel but make explicit some
managerial authority such as requiring potential counsel to provide information pertinent to the
appointment and propose terms for attorney fees,25 and including in the appointment order provi-
sions about awards of attorney fees or nontaxable costs.26  The settlement-approval provisions in
amended Rule 23(e) largely provide criteria and require procedures, but they include wide discre-
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27See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(B).
28See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3).
29See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4)(B).  The withdrawal-approval requirement responds at least in part to the
problem of “bad objectors,” gumming up the settlement works in hope of being paid to go away.  As the
Advisory Committee delicately put it, some objections “may augment the opportunity for obstruction or
delay.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4)(B) advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment.
30See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h)(3).
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limitation to value issues.  In short, Rule 23(h)(4) seems to say that fee-award referrals to magistrate judges
can be about how much, and only that; Rule 54(d)(2)(D) allows them as to whether to award fees as well as
how much.  Rule 72(b) requires de novo district-judge review of challenged magistrate-judge recommenda-
tions on dispositive matters, but the apparent inconsistency about scope of referral remains.
32See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a), 308 U.S. 645, 694 (1938) (amended 1946).
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tion as to the manner of giving required notice of a proposed settlement,27 confer discretionary
authority to require a second opt-out in connection with settlement of a (b)(3) class action,28 and
require court approval of withdrawal of an objection to a proposed settlement.29  New Rule 23(h)’s
fee-award provisions in considerable part establish procedural steps but include discretion whether
to hold a hearing30 or refer some fee-award issues to a master or magistrate judge.31
D.  Managing Disclosure and Discovery Under Rules 26-37 and 45
Initial discussion of trial courts’ extensive authorized managerial powers in connection with
disclosure and discovery seems best approached globally rather than rule by rule, both because of
the partial rearrangement of the rules in 1970 and because of parallel provisions in some aspects of
different rules.  Two requirements involving judicial control that were in the original rules, leave
of court to take a deposition32 and a motion and good-cause showing for production and inspection
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the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, does not
operate to delay any other party’s discovery.
This language, adopted in 1970, still appears in Rule 26(d)--but after a sentence banning discovery efforts
in many cases until after the parties’ Rule 26(f) planning conference, which is itself to precede the Rule 16(b)
scheduling conference.  The net effect of these provisions is that discovery will often start at the earliest
some weeks after initial pleadings and take place in a sequence at least somewhat regulated by the scheduling
order.
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or entry onto premises under Rule 34,33 have been eliminated; motion and a showing of good cause
remain required only for physical and mental examinations under Rule 35(a).34  The abandoned
prior-approval requirements with respect to individual discovery requests, which would no doubt
be an impossible burden today, have of course been replaced with extensive powers to plan and
manage the disclosure-discovery process as a whole as well as rule on particular issues.
An interesting pattern in discovery management’s history is that trial judges’ powers in
some respects seem to have reached a nadir in 1970, with backlash starting in 1980 and continuing
through several rounds of amendments.  The prior-approval requirements for depositions and Rule
34 requests were gone by 1970, and the 1970 amendments both expressly made frequency of use
of discovery methods unlimited unless otherwise ordered35 and allowed discovery in any sequence
and without regard to what other discovery might be taking place.36  One move toward greater
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judicial control was to broaden protective-order authority from depositions to discovery generally,37
but the overall working of discovery--at least as the rules read around 1970--involved heavy empha-
sis on party initiative with judicial involvement coming pretty much exclusively upon party motion.
The great difference with the extensive and proactive management authority of today may
be more understandable in light of what the Advisory Committee had to say about discovery prob-
lems in 1970, based upon a Field Survey of Federal Pretrial Discovery directed by Prof. Maurice
Rosenberg of Columbia Law School.38  In terms that sound breathtakingly quaint today, the Com-
mittee reported:
No widespread or profound failings are disclosed in the scope or availability of
discovery.  The costs of discovery do not appear to be oppressive, as a general mat-
ter, either in relation to ability to pay or to the stakes of the litigation.  Discovery
frequently provides evidence that would not otherwise be available to the parties and
thereby makes for a fairer trial or settlement.39
Contrast the Committee’s view just ten years later, when it proposed a new Rule 26(f) authorizing
the court to summon the parties for a discovery conference:  “There has been widespread criticism
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of abuse of discovery.”40  Still, as originally adopted the discovery-conference authority had to be
invoked by party motion.41
Discovery-rule amendments have been frequent enough since 1980 that proceeding through
their history would be pointlessly tedious.  Instead, given the basic background of where we started
from in 1970, it should suffice to summarize principal managerial powers over disclosure and
discovery as they stand in the rules today:
• Since 1983 under Rule 16(b), required setting of a time to complete discovery in a
scheduling order42 plus authority to modify disclosure times and the amount of
discovery to be permitted43 and, now, to include provisions concerning discovery of
electronically stored information and party agreements on post-production assertion
of privilege or trial-preparation claims;44
• Since 1993 under Rule 16(c)(6), consideration at pretrial conferences of “the control
and scheduling of discovery, including orders affecting disclosures and discovery
pursuant to Rule 26 and Rules 29 through 37”;45
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• Under Rule 26(b)(1) as amended in 2000, authority to decide on party motion whe-
ther to allow “subject-matter” discovery for good cause beyond the party-initiated
discovery of matter “relevant to the claim or defense of any party”;46
• Under Rule 26(b)(2) as amended in 1983, 1993, and 2000, authority on party motion
or court initiative to change rule limits on the number of depositions and interrogato-
ries, to limit the number of admission requests, and to limit discovery on such
grounds as cumulativeness, bypassed opportunity to get information sought, and cost
and burden in relation to stakes;47
• Under Rules 26(b)(2)(B) and 45(d)(1)(D) as added in 2006, to deal with contested
assertions that electronically stored information is in a source identified as “not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost,” including ordering discov-
ery on a showing of good cause and specifying conditions for the discovery, includ-
ing cost-sharing or cost-shifting;48
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• Under Rules 26(b)(5)(B) and 45(d)(2)(B) as added in 2006, to deal with claims of
privilege or trial-preparation protection as to information, electronically stored or
otherwise, that has been produced in discovery49 (a power exercised already50);
• Under Rule 26(c) as broadened in 1970 and further amended in 1993, to enter pro-
tective orders on party motion;51
• Under Rule 26(d) as added in 1970 and amended in 1993 and 2000, on party motion
to control the sequence of discovery;52
• Under Rule 26(f) as amended in 2000, accommodating the “rocket docket” of the
Eastern District of Virginia, by local rule to require that the parties’ Rule 26(f) con-
ference and report take place sooner than provided in the rule itself;53
• Under Rule 26(g) as added in 1983 and amended in 1993, to impose sanctions for
Rule 11-type violations in connection with disclosures and discovery requests, re-
sponses, and objections, without the safe-harbor and deterrence-limit provisions of
Rule 11;54
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• Under Rule 30(d)(3)-(4) as effective (without subparagraphs) in 1938 and amended
in 1970, 1993, and 2000, to impose sanctions for misconduct in depositions and to
terminate or limit depositions;55
• Under Rule 37 as effective in 1938 and substantively amended in 1970, 1980, 1993,
and 2000, to rule on discovery disputes, impose a broad range of sanctions in con-
nection with discovery disputes and misconduct, and to bar use of information by a
party who failed to disclose it as required,56 subject to a limit added in 2006 mostly
forbidding sanctions “under these rules on a party for failing to provide electroni-
cally stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an
electronic information system”;57 and
• Under Rule 45(c) as amended in 1991 and 2006, to protect persons subject to sub-
poenas for discovery as well as trial.58
Discovery must be a fearsome Gulliver to require all those strings, and others I may have over-
looked, to tie him down.
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II.  Are We Getting Civil-ized?
It is easy to find statements to the effect that the advance of pretrial managerialism at least
moves American and civil-law systems closer together.59  Sometimes the assertion seems to be
stronger--that our increasing managerialism makes us work more in the way that supposedly “in-
quisitorial” civil-law judges do.  Alfred Cortese and Kathleen Blaner, for example, argue that “there
has been a convergence of the systems over time . . .  For example, some aspects of the American
system, such as the increasingly managerial role played by the judge, mimic the inquisitorial style
. . .”60  Professor Linda Mullenix states that “particularly in the realm of complex litigation, the
American managerial judge has undertaken roles that are indeed converging with the civil law
inquisitorial judge.”61  And Professor Richard Nagareda sees managerialism working in tandem
with a more inquisitorial role in protecting absent class members:
Under the traditional [adversarial] view, courts are to be passive; parties are to be
active. In class actions today, these postures are often reversed, with conscientious
courts having to assume a more active, inquisitorial, and managerial posture in an
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law systems, means that at least for cases to be tried before juries dependence on party presentation seems
to have to remain predominant.
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attempt to safeguard the passive class members whose rights the class judgment
stands to govern.62
To speak more precisely about similarities and remaining differences, it seems important to
have in mind basic features of the polar “adversarial” and “inquisitorial” models--which, of course,
no system employs in pure form.  The adversarial model associated with common-law systems pre-
sumes a quite passive judge acting in an umpire’s role, with heavy emphasis on party (i.e., lawyer)
initiative and control over a wide range of matters.63  In theory, as Professor J.A. Jolowicz has put
it, “in the adversary process . . . the best judge [was] the judge who, like a jury, knows nothing of
the case he is to try until the trial itself begins”64--although judicial involvement in much American
pretrial discovery long since made that principle, one might say, inoperable here.  Given the degree
of party control, the job of judge or jury as trier of fact is not to ascertain, and especially not to
ferret out, the truth but to resolve the parties’ dispute based on the facts they put forward;65 at best
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we may hope that adversary presentation and cross-examination bring out something approximating
the truth.66
If common-law systems have long worked in ways putting them at some distance from the
purest adversarial model, it is probably the case that civil-law courts never worked in anything close
to an entirely opposite inquisitorial model.  After all, a civil-law judge has no civil dispute to work
with until a party initiates a case against one or more opponents,67 and parties usually have their
own lawyers doing their adversarial best to the extent they can within the system to advance their
side’s cause.  Perhaps two features for our purposes best define the civil-law model with the inquisi-
torial label often given to it:  considerable judge initiative and control in shaping the course of the
proceedings generally,68 and judicial primacy in fact-gathering.69  It is this second feature that seems
alone to warrant the use of the term “inquisitorial” and may account for some imprecision in discus-
sions about whether increasing pretrial managerialism in America is making our system more
“inquisitorial” in nature.
To the extent that civil-law systems give judges the leading role in deciding on what facts
need to be ascertained and bringing them out (thus seeking directly to determine the truth, in con-
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70Interestingly, in civil-justice reforms of the 1990s, England moved not only toward greatly increased
managerialism but also toward more judicial involvement in fact development.  New English procedural
rules
provide for a substantial increase in the judge’s powers of control at the expense of those of
the parties.  . . .  The judge also has the power to control evidence, which he may do by
giving directions on the issues on which he requires evidence, on the nature of the evidence
that he requires to determine those issues and on the way in which the evidence is to be
placed before the court.
Jolowicz, supra note 64, at 287 (footnote omitted).
71Máximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 835,
836 (2005).  Langer adds:
If the adversarial system conceives the relationship between the main procedural
actors as a dispute between two parties before a passive umpire, while the inquisitorial sys-
tem presumes an official investigation that impartial officials conduct to find the truth, the
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possible.
Id. at 878.  The investigative mode, when opposing parties are also involved, can of course also use mana-
gerial techniques in an effort to expedite case processing.
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trast to the pure adversarial model), we seem for the most part not to have moved in their direc-
tion.70 
Neither, as we shall see, do at least some civil-law systems operate in much that way to begin with.
But to the extent that civil-law judges take initiatives to shape the course of proceedings--as some
do considerably and others less so--American pretrial managerialism does take us in their direction.
As Professor Máximo Langer puts it in emphasizing an important distinction, “[U]nlike the court
of the inquisitorial system that actively investigates the truth, the managerial court is active to make
sure that the parties do not delay proceedings.”71  And Professor Rolf Stürner concisely summarizes
similarities and distinctions between managerialism and inquisitorial judging:
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Nearly worldwide, civil procedure relies on party activity, but allows for additional
court activity. The coordination of party activity requires case management by the
court. This case management, which is not an inquisitorial fact finding but invites
the parties to coordinate their activities, is mandatory in many continental codes of
civil procedure and now in the reformed English procedure, too.72
Such managerial judging will inevitably give the American trial judge a good deal of knowl-
edge of the case before trial, just as civil-law judges have often learned much about their cases in
fairly early stages.  There remains, though, a key difference in that much--perhaps most--American
managerialism deals with discovery; civil-law systems (and, for that matter, other common-law
nations) have much less extensive party-initiated discovery than we do.73  So their judges’ control
must be about other aspects of pretrial procedure--particularly scheduling, issue definition and
narrowing, settlement promotion, and of course--where civil-law judges engage in it--“inquisitorial”
fact development.
III.  Some Particulars
A.  Party Control in Civil-Law Systems
One should not understate the degree of control retained by adversarial parties in civil-law
systems, even given a baseline in many countries of greater judicial control than in traditional
American pretrial practice of the pre-managerial era.  In France, for example, party statements of
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the claim, defense, and remedy sought define the litigation and even receive explicit protection in
the code of civil procedure:
French law recognizes a basic concept of the objet du litige, which . . . includes but
does not consist exclusively of the remedy sought by the claimant.  The phrase is
used to refer to . . . the substance of the dispute of which the judge is seised by the
parties.  The “objet du litige,” says the code, “is determined by the respective preten-
sions of the parties,” and these are the claim, which sets the proceedings in motion,
and the defence.  The objet du litige can be modified by the parties through their
incidental claims or defenses, but it is binding on and unalterable by the judge, who
must decide on everything that is claimed and only on what is claimed.74
But when it comes to the evidence the court receives, “It is clear for France, however, that it is not
exclusively for the parties to control the ‘evidence’ that comes before the court for decision.”75
Similarly, Spain’s 2000 Law of Civil Procedure
maintains the principles of party disposition . . . as overriding principles of Spanish
civil justice.  Under these principles, parties determine the subject matter and scope
of the issues of the proceeding, if and when it is initiated, and if it is to be volun-
tarily terminated.  Within the proceedings themselves, the parties, not the court,
usually decide the source of factual proof for the contentions at issue.  . . .  A system
of civil procedure is designed to protect the rights of individuals involved in legal
disputes that, as a general rule, are controlled by the parties to the dispute.76
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Whatever the degree of their control and even initiative, then, civil-law judges at least in some
systems do not take on the character of what Americans sometimes call roving commissioners.77
B.  Directions of Movement in Civil-Law Countries
Discussion of pretrial-management changes so far in this essay, and to a considerable extent
in the American literature on convergence, has been of American developments and the extent to
which they take us toward civil-law patterns.  Civil-law systems, of course, are not standing still;
interestingly, in responding to modern civil-litigation problems, they are sometimes not moving
toward us but in parallel with (or ahead of) us.  The role of French judges was defined in quite
passive terms from the Napoleonic era until 1965, with the judge initially to do “no more than to
decide between the rival contentions of the parties.”78  A 1935 reform authorized the judge to
“summon the parties and their lawyers to appear before him, but he could not make binding orders
and he could do nothing that might prejudge a question of substance.”79  Only in 1965 did the
French judge get
real power.  He can make orders binding on the parties and impose sanctions.  He
can lay down time limits and he can make orders relating to the instruction [fact-
finding procedures authorized by the judge]; when it comes to the hearing of witnes-
ses, even if ordered on the application of a party, the judge decides what are the
relevant facts to be proved, and it is he who examines the witnesses.80
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Further, the French civil code provides,
“Everyone is bound to co-operate with the administration of justice with a view to
revelation of the truth.”  In addition the parties are explicitly required . . . to cooper-
ate in the conduct of fact finding measures ordered by the judge.81
By contrast, under the former Berlusconi government proposed changes in Italian civil
procedure went precisely the other way.  The model was presented as “privatizing” civil justice,
with the preparatory stage “taken away from the hands of the judge and entrusted exclusively to
those of the parties’ lawyers.  No more ‘managerial judges’, therefore, but only ‘managerial law-
yers’ . . .”82  The preparatory phase “will consist only and exclusively of the exchange of a number
of written pleadings and briefs between the parties’ lawyers, without having any contact with the
judge.  . . .  All this may be put to an end only when a party will feel satisfied and will ask the judge
to fix the hearing for the presentation of evidence.”83   The current Prodi government is not contin-
uing this movement against the current in most other systems, but has not brought forth any plans
to increase the judicial role.84  An additional practical factor may limit pretrial managerialism by
Italian judges--sheer underinvestment in judicial resources leaving judges so swamped that they
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cannot take managerial initiatives.85  In Italian litigation little or no court involvement may take
place until one or both parties decide to rattle the judicial cage.
C.  Promotion of Settlement and Alternative Dispute Resolution
One phenomenon--not entirely an uncontroversial one--that has come along with American
managerial judging is judicial promotion of settlement and use of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) approaches such as early neutral evaluation, court-annexed mediation or arbitration, or other
devices.  Sometimes judges just suggest one or another form of ADR for a particular case, but it is
explicit in Federal Rule 16(c) that they may have the parties consider at pretrial conferences, and
“may take appropriate action, with respect to . . . (9) settlement and the use of special procedures
to assist in resolving the dispute when authorized by statute or local rule.”86  And on the statute
books since 1998 have been requirements that each district court “authorize, by local rule . . . the
use of alternative dispute resolution processes in all civil actions [and] devise and implement its
own alternative dispute resolution program, by local rule . . . to encourage and promote the use of
alternative dispute resolution in its district.”87  Promotion of settlement and ADR is thus not just a
significant feature of American federal pretrial practice; it is institutionalized.
So it is, and has long been (but with recently increased emphasis) in France.  Judicial re-
sponsibility to attempt conciliation has been present in the French code of civil procedure for most
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of the past two centuries.88  Moreover, since 1996 French judges may with party consent appoint a
mediator; and since 1998 legal aid has been available to try to help parties reach settlements.89  Of
Germany, Professor Resnik refers to “the vigorous efforts of German judges to convince parties to
settle.”90  Similarly, to give just a few other examples, recent reforms in Norway require mediation,
and Finland has just adopted a new mediation law; Swedish and English procedural codes and
practices entail settlement promotion.91  It seems unnecessary to delve deeply into practice in other
civil-law nations to conclude that some basic similarities are present.
D.  Inquisitorial Fact-Finding in America
If it is generally accurate to say that American managerialism does not converge with the
inquisitorial aspect of civil-law judging (to the extent that civil-law systems actually have it), such
fact-finding is not invariably absent from our managerial judging--although the occasions for it may
be quite limited.  First, judges may choose to make more use of court-designated experts:  “Th[e]
transformative potential of Daubert,[92] coupled with the modern willingness to accept the role of
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the managerial judge, may encourage a greater degree of inquisitorial thinking, opening the door to
institutions like court-appointed experts and scientific tribunals.”93  Second, the role of trial judges
in deciding whether to approve proposed class settlements, especially when no objectors appear to
present challenges, is likely to involve some degree of judicially initiated inquiry.94  Third, the role
of masters in complex litigation, particularly of the public-law variety, may take on inquisitorial
aspects:
[W]hile the pre- and post-trial stages of complex litigation are clearly new develop-
ments, the inquisitorial judicial role for which they call--and which masters are
being asked to serve--is not. Judicial involvement in managing the litigation (partic-
ularly discovery) and in undertaking significant responsibility for fact-finding (in-
cluding ex parte investigations) is a well-established, longstanding feature of An-
glo-American legal culture--a feature of equity's forgotten, quasi-inquisitorial tradi-
tion, in which masters played a critical part.95
Still, it seems likely that American staffing traditions, including the lack of a civil-servant
judiciary trained in fact-gathering, and American norms will sharply limit just how far American
judges go in inquisitorial directions:
Suffice it to say that American judges, trained in and accustomed to an adversary
structure, are “ill-equipped for effective inquisitorial judging.”  Not only is an inves-
tigatory or managerial judicial role incompatible with the highly entrenched ad-
versarial norms and customs in the U.S. legal system, but American judges lack the
investigatory resources available to judges in an inquisitorial system.  The federal
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judiciary operates on a limited budget and with restricted factfinding powers, limit-
ing its capabilities outside the context of an adversarial dispute.  Moreover, even if
inquisitorial judging techniques were technically compatible with current legal
structures . . . they are not desirable given the democratic premises on which the
nation's adversary system is based.96
IV.  Conclusion
It does appear that some of the gaps between American and civil-law systems have been
narrowed by the development and institutionalization of pretrial managerial judging in the federal
courts in this country, and by reforms in Europe.  In particular, managerialism definitely moves
away from the classic adversarial model of the passive judge, and can shift a significant amount of
control over the pretrial process from the parties to the court.  That general change does bring us
somewhat closer to the degree of judicial control often seen in many civil-law systems, although the
level of party control in those systems should not be underestimated.  But two significant differ-
ences remain, both related to approaches to fact-gathering:  To the extent that civil-law judges have
the main initiative-taking role in the fact-gathering process, American managerial judges largely
have not moved in that direction--nor do they seem likely to.  Thus we have moved significantly
toward “inquisitorial” systems only as that label refers to civil-law systems as a whole, not to their
inquisitorial aspect.  And as long as American pretrial proceedings involve much more of the kind
of discovery that we have now than do other systems, the focus of pretrial management in America
will be much more on discovery than elsewhere.
Rowe draft for Southwestern symposium December 12, 2006
97Nicolò Trocker & Vincenzo Varano, Concluding Remarks, in REFORMS, supra note 76, 243, 244-45 (foot-
notes omitted).
-28-
Professors Nicolò Trocker and Vincenzo Varano provide a nuanced view on degrees of
convergence and lack thereof in a concluding essay to a volume on recent procedural reforms in
several nations:
[T]he reform movement has brought about an attenuation of the differences,
according to which we were used to classify procedural models.  If the common law
procedural systems were usually defined as adversarial, based as they were on the
predominance of the parties, they are presently placing more and more emphasis on
the role and powers of the judge especially as far as the management of procedure
is concerned.  . . .  Civil law procedural systems, in turn, which used to be labeled as
inquisitorial in an even more arbitrary and simplistic way, not only have made clear
their adherence to the principles of parties’ initiative, and adversary procedure, but
they have also reshaped their character, sometimes adopting institutions typical of
the common law such as the cross-examination, other times opening the door to such
ideas as that embodied in the mechanisms of discovery or moving towards a bifurca-
tion of the proceeding clearly based on the pretrial/trial separation experience.97
For the parties and their lawyers, finally, pretrial managerial judging means not only a re-
duction in the control that they (or their predecessors) were used to exercising in more fully adver-
sarial modes of proceeding.  It also requires that the adversarial scorpions in their litigation bottle
seek ways to cooperate, at least as to pretrial procedural management, with each other and the
judge.  Such cooperation may be uncomfortable, although it is likely to be in litigants’ enlightened
self-interest.  And the reduction of control may be unwelcome, although I have heard litigators at
conferences confess that they can need “adult supervision.”  Still, while
institutionalization of managerial judging measures would move our system closer
to an inquisitorial [sic] system of civil dispute resolution, these measures would not
turn our essentially adversarial system into an essentially inquisitorial one.  Litigants
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will not lose control over those aspects of their cases that are essential to an adver-
sarial system of justice.98
